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Abstract: 
Different from classification and taxonomy, typology meets the criteria of a theory and is a unique form of theory
building. Typology is a good first step in exploring a research topic, and, therefore, we are concerned with building
typological theories for underdeveloped topics with limited studies. We propose a four-step approach involving content
analysis, multidimensional scaling, judgmental analysis, and empirical testing to guide researchers in developing
typological theories in their domains of interest using a quantitative approach that rides on empirical methods and
industry wisdom. Previous research in information security has paid little attention to employees’ deviant behavior in
the workplace. We, therefore, built a typology of information security deviant behavior as an example to illustrate the
theory development process. We discuss the theoretical, methodological, and practical implications of this study. 
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1 Introduction 
Typology has been a popular approach in management and social sciences to understand organizational 
phenomena (Doty & Glick, 1994) and is useful for providing an explanatory framework for discussion and 
for formulating hypotheses (Clinard, Quinney, & Wildeman, 1994). However, it has not been broadly 
developed in the information systems area (Nevo, Nevo, & Ein-Dor, 2010). Guillemette and Paré (2012) 
have proposed a new typological theory of the IT function’s contribution in organizations. However, as 
Guillemette and Paré (2012) emphasize, they used a qualitative approach that depends heavily on 
literature to establish the typology, and such a methodology may not be useful for exploring 
underdeveloped topics in the literature. Therefore, we need to develop a quantitative approach that 
develops a fully specified typology based on empirical methods in a systematic manner. With this study, 
we present just such an attempt. We present how a typological theory can be built for a relatively 
underdeveloped topic in information security―employees’ information security deviant behavior (ISDB) in 
organizations (e.g., writing down passwords and installing untrusted applications). We chose to study 
ISDB because it is an important but underdeveloped topic. Twenty years ago, Loch, Carr, and Warkentin 
(1992, p. 184) commented that “employees and internal organizational procedures are a greater threat 
than competitors” and in more recent times, Hu, Xu, Diney, & Ling (2011, p. 54) emphasize that “human 
agents are still the weakest link in the defense against outside attacks and the most dangerous to the 
organizations from within”. However, scholars have found prior research work in this area to be insufficient 
(Siponen, Willison, & Baskerville, 2008), and the concept of information security deviance is still unclear 
(Willison & Siponen, 2009). Typology is a good first step in exploring a behavior because it provides a 
clearer picture of what a behavior is and how its variants are interrelated. Our quantitative approach 
shows how it does.  
This paper has several useful implications for both researchers and managers. Theory development is 
crucial to the growth of information systems research and IS scholars encourage researchers to build new 
theories in information systems research topics (Gregor, 2006; Weber, 2012). The typology developed in 
this paper meets the criteria for being a theory (Doty & Glick 1994). In terms of theoretical contributions, 
we demonstrate how a typological theory can be built for a relatively underdeveloped topic and how the 
typology developed forms a basis for further theoretical work. It is a useful starting point for developing an 
organized and theoretical framework for systematic research on ISDB and a critical starting point for 
deriving measures of the deviance. Regarding practical significance, with our findings, managers can 
understand different forms of ISDB, their relationships, and their impacts on organizations. In terms of 
methodological contributions, we use MDS, together with some statistical analysis methods, to develop 
the typological theory. MDS itself depends solely on data and is usually used to develop inductive and 
empirically derived models. However, we use it to develop a typological theory that may provide another 
approach for theory building. The proposed procedure for developing a typology is useful for exploring a 
behavior with infinite forms such as ISDB. 
We structure the paper as follows: in Section 2, we review the criteria for a typological theory. In Section 
3, we discuss why a typology is needed for ISDB. In Section 4, we describe in detail the quantitative 
approach for developing a typological theory of ISDB. In Section 5, we discuss the implications of the 
findings and directions for future research. Finally, in Section 6, we conclude the paper. 
2 Typological Theory 
Many researchers view typology as classification or taxonomy and use these three terms interchangeably 
(e.g., Campbell & Lu, 2007; Earl, 2001; Heo & Han, 2003). Doty and Glick (1994), however, argue that 
typology is different from classification and taxonomy because typology is a unique form of theory building 
and that classification and taxonomy are not. Guilllemette and Paré (2012) discuss this point in detail but 
they do not mention the criteria for being a typological theory. Doty and Glick (1994, p. 233) propose that, 
for a typology to be a theory, it must fulfill three primary criteria: “a) constructs must be identified”, “b) 
relationships among these constructs must be specified”, and “c) these relationships must be falsifiable”. 
Based on these three criteria, many existing typologies are then not typologies but classification systems. 
In addition to the above three primary criteria, many researchers have addressed the need to set 
boundaries when building a theory and stated that all theories are constrained by their specific bounding 
assumptions because the implicit values of the theorist and explicit limitations of the theory are embedded 
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in the assumptions (Bacharach, 1989; Dubin, 1978; Weber, 2012). Therefore, besides the three primary 
criteria, we should take the notion of boundaries into consideration when developing a typology. 
3 Information Security Deviant Behavior 
3.1 Lack of Studies in Information Security Deviant Behavior 
Previous information security research is dominated by the subject’s technical, management, and policy 
aspects and seldom studies information security behavior (Chu, Chau, & So, Forthcoming; von Solms, 
2000, 2006; Zafar & Clark, 2009). Siponen et al. (2008) conducted an in-depth review of literature 
published between 1990 and 2004 on information security and found that only 1.17 percent (15 out of 
1,280 papers) studied information security behavior. Even when information security behavior was 
studied, most studies focused on positive forms of behavior such as employees’ adoption of security 
measures (e.g., Hu & Dinev, 2005; Lee & Kozar, 2008; Lee & Larsen, 2009) or their protective behavior 
on information security (e.g., Hu, Diney, Hart, & Cooke, 2012; Posey, Roberts, Lowry, Bennett, & 
Courtney, 2013). Although these studies shed light on how employees protect their computers from being 
hacked or attacked and the findings help managers to create better awareness programs to increase the 
organizational information security level, a more proactive way to protect organizational information 
security is to avert employees from being threats to their organizations (Fenz, Ekelhart, & Neubauer, 
2011), and, thus, the need to understand ISDB demands greater research emphasis (Choobineh, Dhillon, 
Grimaila, & Rees, 2007; Chu & Chau, 2014; Mahmood, Siponen, Straub, & Rao, 2010; Willison & 
Warkentin, 2013). However, to date, we still poorly understand the information security deviance of 
employees in the workplace (Willison & Siponen, 2009). Few attempts have been made to organize the 
behavior. Campbell and Lu (2007) classify information technology abuse. The authors divide information 
technology abuse into four types—nonproductive use, negligent use, counterproductive use, and corrupt 
use. However, the classification was mainly based on subjective arguments. Stanton, Stan, Mastrangelo, 
& Jolton (2005) use an empirical approach to analyze positive forms of end user security-related behavior 
and refer to constructive deviance that results in organizational benefits and negative forms of end user 
security-related behavior, which represents destructive deviance that leads to organizational harm. After 
collecting opinions on the security behavior from 110 interviewees, the authors developed a six-element 
taxonomy of the behavior. The six elements were intentional destruction, detrimental misuse, dangerous 
tinkering, naïve mistakes, aware assurance, and basic hygiene. The classification provides some insights 
on the different types of positive and negative security behavior. However, we still do not know the 
relationships among the types of the behavior or how the classification is operationalized. To explore this 
topic, we need to develop a typology of ISDB and understand how different types of the behavior are 
interrelated and organized.  
The literature covers various topics in information security deviance such as password behavior 
(Hoonakker, Bornoe, & Carayon, 2009), information systems misuse (D’Arcy & Hovav, 2007a, 2007b; 
D’Arcy, Hovav, & Galletta, 2009; Hovav & D’Arcy 2012), and Internet abuse (Schechtman, Marett, & 
Wells, 2006), but previous studies have seldom showed the interrelationships among different forms of the 
deviance. A shortcoming of some previous studies is that they do not adequately define the behaviors 
they describe because relatively little is known about broadening the range of deviant behavior in 
information security over time and an organizing framework for the behavior is unavailable. Therefore, we 
need to understand and clarify the deviant behavior in information security, which we do in this paper. As 
such, our three research questions are: 1) what is ISDB?; 2) what are the set of “ideal types” of the 
behavior, each of which shows unique characteristics of organizations and can be described by a 
construct?; and 3) how are different types of the behavior interrelated and organized? Accordingly, we 
provide a systematic and methodological process to define and describe ISDB. We develop a typology of 
the behavior to provide a theoretical framework for describing the similarities and differences among the 
types of the behavior and help researchers and managers to better understand the many variants of the 
behavior. We integrate knowledge from the literature with industry wisdom to develop a typology of ISDB.  
3.2 Defining Information Security Deviant Behavior 
We identified studies on negative forms of information security behavior in organizations based on 
Webster and Watson’s (2002) paper-identification methodology (which includes searching: 1) journal 
databases, 2) the citations of identified papers, and 3) the social sciences citation index and the Web of 
Science) that many researchers such as Melville, Kraemer, and Gurbaxani (2004) and Brown and Grant 
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(2005) have adopted. We used the key words “information security”, “behavior/behaviour”, and 
“organization/organisation”. Appendix A lists the different types of negative forms of information security 
behavior studied in the past. We found that the nature of the negative forms of information security 
behavior discussed varies a lot and the perpetrators differ. For example, computer abuse could be in the 
form of misuse, theft, hacking, attacking, or intrusion committed by external hackers, while omissive 
behavior is exhibited by employees who forget to implement the necessary measures. Computer abuse 
and omissive behavior are, to a certain extent, mutually exclusive. We explore employees’ deviant 
behavior in information security in organizations to understand which specific acts of employees violate 
information security norms We need a study on ISDB to explain this organizational phenomenon and to 
help organize the interrelationships among the various types of the deviance. 
Some previous works have attempted to examine specific forms of deviant workplace behavior in 
information security such as non-work-related computing. Pee, Woon, and Kankanhali (2008) refers to 
non-work-related computing as employees’ usage of the Internet or information systems resources for 
personal purposes in the workplace. This and other such studies offer us some constructive insights on 
why employees spend time on non-work-related computing and the influence of this unwanted usage on 
job performance. However, some researchers (e.g., Belanger & Slyke, 2002; Oravec, 2002) suggest that 
allowing employees to use the Internet for non-work-related activities in a supervised manner could make 
them more creative and productive. In other words, non-work-related computing may be beneficial to 
organizations if it is properly supervised. Hence, under the definition that Pee et al. (2008) provide, non-
work-related computing may not be directly considered as information security deviance. Therefore, we 
need to define clearly what ISDB is and how different types of the behavior are organized. Without clearly 
defining the behavior and knowing the interrelationships of different types of it, further investigations may 
be difficult. This could be the very reason why only isolated research efforts on information security 
deviance have been made in the past. 
We define ISDB here as the voluntary behavior of employees in organizations that differs markedly from 
the organizations’ information security norms and that other employees normally consider to be 
inappropriate behavior in organizations. We use “deviant” (i.e., in information security deviant behavior) 
because the behavior we primarily consider in this study violates information security norms in 
organizations but is usually not regarded as criminal behavior, which is best defined and assessed by a 
legal system (Griffin & Lopez, 2005). We compared different definitions of information security from 
previous studies and adopted Whitman and Mattord’s (2004, p. 4) definition—“the protection of 
information and its critical elements, including the systems and hardware that use, store, and transmit that 
information”—because their definition includes the protection of systems and hardware and is not 
restricted to the disclosure of information. We explore employees’ ISDB by developing a typology for the 
behavior. We exclude any behavior resulting from accidents (e.g., accidental entry of incorrect data), 
external factors (e.g., outsider hackers), or incidents not involving humans (e.g., electrical power failures) 
that influence the levels of information security of organizations from the current study. 
4 A Quantitative Approach for Developing a Typology 
Table 1 shows a table of the sequence of research methodologies one can use to develop a typology. The 
first column of Table 1 describes the four important criteria that a theory should meet (the setting of 
boundaries that Bacharach (1989), Dubin (1978), and Weber (2012) propose, plus the three criteria that 
Doty and Glick (1994) suggest). We summarize the research methodologies and techniques used in 
Guilllemette and Paré (2012) to meet the four criteria for building a typology of IT function in organizations 
in columns 2 and 3. The authors depended on intensively reviewing the literature to establish the typology. 
We propose a quantitative approach of developing a typology that involves four key steps: content 
analysis, multidimensional scaling (MDS) (Kruskal & Wish, 1978), judgmental analysis, and empirical 
testing, which correspond to the four criteria in columns 4 and 5. The advantage of our quantitative 
approach is that we integrate knowledge with industry wisdom to develop a typology of ISDB. That is, 
instead of using our collective judgment on the literature, we conducted surveys to collect industry 
opinions. As Chiasson and Davidson (2005, p. 591) state: “Industry provides an important contextual 
‘space’ to build new IS theory and to evaluate the boundaries of existing IS theory”. We follow the four 
steps to illustrate how one can develop a typology of ISDB that meets the four criteria. 
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Table 1. Procedure for Developing a Typology
Steps for building typology 
Qualitative method
(expanding the understanding on 
well-developed topics)
Quantitative method 
(exploring underdeveloped topics) 
Research 
methodologies Techniques 
Research 
methodologies Techniques 
Setting boundaries Content analysis Literature Content analysis Survey (Survey I) Expert opinions 
Identifying constructs 
Authors’ 
collective 
judgment 
Literature Multidimensional scaling Survey (Survey II)
Specifying relationship among the 
constructs 
Authors’ 
collective 
judgment 
Literature Judgmental analysis Survey (Survey III)
Testing the relationships Pattern matching analysis 
Executive 
interviews Empirical testing Survey (Survey IV)
In step 1 (content analysis), we set the bounding assumptions for developing theory. We conducted a 
survey (Survey I) to compile a list of typical descriptions in ISDB based on definitions and assumptions. In 
step 2 (MDS), we identified the constructs for the typology. We conducted another survey (Survey II) and 
used MDS to develop dimensions for describing ISDB. We derived ideal types of ISDB and a typology 
based on the MDS findings. In step 3 (judgmental analysis), we interpreted the dimensions. We carried 
out a third survey (Survey III) to determine the best attributes for describing the identified dimensions of 
the typology and specifying the relationships among different types of ISDB. Kruskal and Wish (1978) 
suggest this step for interpreting dimensions. In step 4 (empirical testing), we demonstrated the 
falsifiability of the typology. We conducted a fourth survey (Survey IV) to collect opinions from IT 
professionals to validate the interaction of the constructs in the typology. Appendix B summarizes a profile 
of the samples in Surveys I, II, III, and IV. 
4.1 Step 1: Content Analysis 
We conducted Survey I to generate a list of typical and representative descriptions in ISDB for research. 
We approached five non-profit making organizations that organized various business activities and 
seminars for employees in various positions and from various industries to attend and obtained their 
permission to distribute questionnaires to the attendees during those activities and seminars, some of 
which were information technology (IT)-related while others were not. We briefly introduced the study to 
our target respondents before distributing the questionnaires to them. The questionnaires provided the 
definitions of ISDB and information security on their first page. We asked our target respondents to 
describe three incidents of “employee engaging in something considered to be information security 
deviant behavior in organization”. We did not require names or personal identities from the respondents, 
which assured their complete anonymity. We received a total of 204 usable responses. 
After the survey, the first author and a research assistant worked independently to simplify and reword the 
descriptions of the incidents provided by the respondents into clear statements describing different forms 
of ISDB. We then compared and discussed their work. We constructed a pool of descriptions in ISDB. 
This content development procedure has been commonly adopted in social sciences research (e.g., 
Anandarajan, Devine, & Simmers, 2004; Robinson & Bennett, 1995). To further ensure that the 
descriptions on the consolidated list of behavior were clear enough and were representative of all the 
incidents the respondents described, we invited a doctoral student in the MIS field to double-check the 
pool of descriptions against the responses collected. We obtained a list of 43 descriptions in ISDB. Two 
MIS academics and two information security professionals then reviewed the list to ensure that the 
descriptions would be easily understood by most people who use computers at work and that they were 
applicable to various types of organizations. Basically, the reviewers agreed with the descriptions and 
made only minor changes to the wording.  
We then invited ten judges—five MIS academics and five information security professionals—to assess 
independently whether or not the descriptions of the behavior identified in the list were ISDB based on our 
definition. The descriptions needed to pass three key criteria. First, the behavior needed to be voluntary. 
Second, the behavior needed to be conducted by employees in their organizations. Third, the behavior 
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needed to violate the information security norms of most organizations. We also asked the judges to 
suggest any other descriptions in ISDB not covered in the list. Basically, all judges agreed that the 43 
descriptions in the list described ISDB according to our definition. One of the industry judges, however, 
had reservations about three descriptions of the behavior—“employee being too lazy to change password 
at work periodically”, “employee using the same password for all company system logins for 
convenience”, and “employee abusing business email account for personal purposes at work”. That judge 
felt that the first two descriptions were controversial because both forms of password behavior are too 
common in the workplace and so should not be treated as deviance. The judge also felt that the third 
description may not be relevant because the behavior affects personal data security rather than a 
company’s information security. To remove possible ambiguities and to make sure that the list is 
representative, we decided to delete these three descriptions. All judges also thought that the list was 
comprehensive enough and that no additional incidents needed to be included. The first column in Table 2 
lists a final pool of 40 descriptions in ISDB. 
4.2 Step 2: Multidimensional Scaling 
4.2.1 Advantages of Using MDS 
We used MDS to develop the typology. MDS is a statistical method that helps one to systematize the 
relationships among n objects (or variables) in a map—a graphical representation of a k-dimensional 
coordinate system, where k is predetermined. MDS can be a useful tool for developing typologies for 
topics such as ISDB in which the organizing concepts and underlying dimensions are not well-developed 
because MDS adopts an inductive approach to understand the relationships among objects and presents 
their similarity relationships in a map. However, few researchers in the information systems field have 
adopted MDS to develop typologies (Nevo et al., 2010). Even when scholars have used MDS, they have 
adopted it to set up classification systems (e.g., Hult & Chabowski, 2008; Larsen 2003; McQuaid, Ong, 
Chen, & Nunamaker, 1999; Posey et al., 2013). MDS itself depends solely on data and is usually used to 
develop inductive and empirically derived models. In this study, we use it to develop a typology that 
provides another approach for theory building. 
4.2.2 Data Collection 
We conducted Survey II to identify the constructs for the typology of ISDB. We invited 195 employees 
from 10 organizations from various industries—three finance/insurance companies, two government 
departments, one retail company, one IT firm, two logistics-related companies, and one business service 
company—to participate in this study. We gave them a questionnaire containing the list of 40 descriptions 
in ISDB; the top of each page briefly described a target behavior (one of the 40 descriptions). This means 
that we had 40 versions of the questionnaire in total. Before answering the questionnaire, we briefly 
instructed all respondents to make sure that they understood all descriptions in the list. We required all 
respondents to perform two tasks. First, they had to rate each form of the behavior in terms of its similarity 
to or difference from that of the target behavior by using nine-point Likert scales (1 = very similar, 9 = very 
different). Second, they had to write down the criterion/criteria they had used to distinguish between the 
target behavior and the different forms of ISDB in the list. We did not record names or individual identities 
in the questionnaires to obtain honest responses. 
4.2.3 MDS Results 
A common measure for assessing how well a particular MDS configuration represents the 
proximity/dissimilarity among different forms of a behavior is the stress index (Kruskal, 1964). The smaller 
the stress index, the better the fit of the particular configuration. We plotted the stress of the best-fitted 
configuration in one, two, three, four, and five dimensions in the scree plot of stress. The respective stress 
levels were 0.47, 0.27, 0.18, 0.13, and 0.1. The scree plot does not exactly illustrate the number of 
dimensions needed but it does suggest that two is the minimum because we found a sudden drop from 
0.47 to 0.27 in the stress value in the two-dimensional solution. Besides stress values, Kruskal and Wish 
(1978) suggests that interpretability and ease of use are crucial decision factors when selecting the 
“correct” or “true” dimensionality and the number of interpretable directions can be less than the 
dimensionality of the space. Therefore, we selected the two-dimensional solution. Appendix C provides 
more details of the MDS implementation.  
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Table 2 lists the coordinates of the 40 descriptions in ISDB in the two-dimensional configuration. Some 
values of the coordinates are positive while others are negative. Figure 1 shows a two-dimension 
perceptual map for ISDB based on the coordinates. For clearer illustration, we display only the numbers 
representing their respective forms of ISDB in Table 2. There are four regions in a two-dimensional space, 
which means that four distinct first-order constructs are expected according to the degree of similarity of 
different forms of ISDB. 
Table 2. The Coordinates of the 40 Descriptions in ISDB in the Two-dimensional Configuration
Item Dimension 1 Dimension 2
1. Employee not locking his/her work computer when away for convenience. 1.50 0.22 
2. Employee not shutting down his/her work computer after finished using it for 
convenience. 
1.49 0.32 
3. Employee leaving his/her removable storage devices with company information 
unattended in office. 
1.44 0.01 
4. Employee leaving printouts with company information unattended in office. 1.33 0.55 
5. Employee allowing non-employees to freely use his/her work computer. 1.29 0.18 
6. Employee using colleague's computer without permission.  0.82 -0.40 
7. Employee using simple or no password at work for convenience. 1.23 -0.90 
8. Employee sharing personal password/account at work with colleagues. 1.47 -0.54 
9. Employee writing down personal passwords in visible place. 1.43 -0.35 
10. Employee gaining unauthorized access to look at or change company data or 
files. 
0.74 -0.88 
11. Employee guessing his/her colleague's password to gain unauthorized access at 
work. 
0.99 -1.25 
12. Employee taking away company information without permission. 0.68 1.40 
13. Employee copying company documents into his/her removable storage devices 
without permission. 
0.68 1.16 
14. Employee not encrypting company documents when they are required to do so. 0.68 0.12 
15. Employee using untrusted network (e.g., the Internet) for data transmission at 
work. 
-0.46 0.85 
16. Employee disclosing company information for non-work-related purposes. 1.10 1.30 
17. Employee using removable storage devices at work without following company 
security guidelines. 
0.33 1.13 
18. Employee saving documents in improper locations (e.g., shared folder, mailbox) 
at work. 
0.74 0.54 
19. Employee installing untrusted applications for personal purposes at work. -1.46 0.61 
20. Employee running untrusted applications for personal purposes at work. -1.36 0.46 
21. Employee intentionally stopping company's security protection (e.g., antivirus 
software, Web filtering) at work. 
-0.77 -0.12 
22. Employee making company information accessible by unauthorized peer-to-peer 
applications. 
0.25 0.58 
23. Employee using instant messaging services at work without permission. -1.32 1.34 
24. Employee intentionally opening suspicious e-mails/Web links at work. -1.65 -0.05 
25. Employee intentionally forwarding suspicious e-mails/Web links to colleagues at 
work. 
-1.49 -0.38 
26. Employee intentionally browsing untrusted/suspicious websites at work. -1.55 0.08 
27. Employee processing company data in his/her personal notebook at work without 
permission. 
0.13 1.61 
28. Employee purposely distributing malicious code (e.g., virus, Trojans, spyware) at
work. 
-1.54 -0.82 
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Table 2. The Coordinates of the 40 Descriptions in ISDB in the Two-dimensional Configuration
29. Employee downloading illegal materials (e.g., applications, music, videos) from 
the Internet at work. 
-1.77 0.43 
30. Employee extending corporate network (e.g., adding extra access points) in 
office without permission. 
-0.62 0.45 
31. Employee using personal email account for business purposes at work without 
permission. 
-0.61 1.54 
32. Employee connecting to unauthorized wireless network at work. -1.02 0.91 
33. System administrator not properly destroying information in computer hard disk 
which is going to be disposed of. 
0.46 -1.51 
34. System administrator over-granting access permissions to users. 0.06 -1.33 
35. System administrator not performing critical security audits and assessments for 
company. 
-0.51 -1.19 
36. System administrator not performing essential data backups for company. -0.79 -1.91 
37. System administrator being reluctant to fix security-related application 
errors/loopholes for company. 
-0.82 -0.91 
38. System administrator using default password setting or configuration in 
company's servers for convenience. 
-0.14 -1.60 
39. System administrator not employing reliable security controls over the wireless 
network (such as WPA or above) at work. 
-0.63 -1.05 
40. System administrator enabling remote access to company network without 
permission. 
-0.32 -0.64 
   
Figure 1. A Two-dimensional Perceptual Map1
                                                     
1 Only the numbers representing their respective forms of ISDB are shown. 
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4.3 Step 3: Judgmental Analysis 
4.3.1 Opinion Elicitation 
In Survey II, we asked respondents not only to rate each form of the behavior in terms of its overall 
similarity to the target behavior but also to state the criterion/criteria they had used to make their 
judgments of comparison. We generated several potential attributes that describe the two dimensions on 
the perceptual map based on the criteria the respondents stated. We then translated the potential 
attributes into a number of bipolar scales. For example, one respondent wrote that his criterion to 
distinguish between the target behavior and the different forms of ISDB in the list was “risk of exposing 
sensitive data”. We interpreted this attribute as “high risk of exposing sensitive data/low risk of exposing 
sensitive data”. We decided whether to include an attribute based on the high frequency cited by the 
respondents and reasonable interpretability of the dimensions. At last, we identified 12 bipolar scales: 
“planned/spontaneous”, “serious/not serious”, “difficult to commit/easy to commit”, “frequent 
occurrence/occasional occurrence”, “direct harm to organization/indirect harm to organization”, “data 
leakage to outsiders/data leakage to insiders”, “desire to gain personal benefits/desire to hurt 
organization”, “high risk of exposing data/low risk of exposing data”, “protection-related issue/destruction-
related issue”, “easy to detect/difficult to detect”, “may incur severe punishment/may incur mild 
punishment”, and “security policy can help avert the deviance/security policy cannot help avert the 
deviance”.  
Again, we elicited industry wisdom and used regression analysis to interpret the two dimensions. We 
conducted Survey III and invited 30 industry practitioners with various expertise and from various 
backgrounds to evaluate how well the potential attributes explain ISDB. Ten such practitioners were 
academics in various fields, ten were information security professionals, and the remaining ten were 
managers in non-IT departments. We conducted this exercise, for respondents from different backgrounds 
to give their opinions on the attributes because the ISDB should be relevant to a wide range of careers 
and organizations. We provided each respondents with an Excel worksheet with a list of the 40 
descriptions in ISDB and the 12 bipolar scales, which they measured on a seven-point rating scale. They 
were required to rate the degree of relatedness of the 40 descriptions with each other along each of the 
12 scales. Altogether, we received 40x12 = 480 ratings from each judge. The bipolar scale ratings 
collected could guide the interpretation of the two dimensions developed. All respondents worked 
independently and the findings show that they did not misunderstand the meanings of the 40 descriptions 
before completing the task. 
4.3.2 Interpreting the Two Dimensions 
We calculated the mean ratings from the 30 respondents for each of the 40 descriptions in ISDB along 
each bipolar scale. In other words, we ended up with 40x12 mean ratings associated with the 40x12 
combinations of description in ISDB and bipolar scale. We then regressed each of the means of the 
bipolar scales (dependent variable) on the coordinates of the two dimensions (independent variables) 
listed in Table 2. We ran separate regressions for each bipolar scale to assess the fitness of each 
attribute. Table 3 shows the regression results on the 12 bipolar scales and the two-dimension 
configuration, together with the correlations among the bipolar scales. The first two columns of Table 3 
give β1 and β2, the beta weights on dimensions one and two, respectively. The third column of Table 3 
shows the multiple correlation coefficient (R) between the two dimensions and the respective bipolar 
scales, which assess the predictive power of the two dimensions. A positive/negative value for the beta 
weight shows a positive/negative association of the dimension with the bipolar scale and the larger the 
magnitude of beta implies a stronger the relationship between the dimension and the bipolar scale. We 
found that only eight of the bipolar scales significantly described the two-dimensional configuration—three 
of the multiple correlation coefficients were significant at the 0.001 level, three at the 0.01 level, and two at 
the 0.05 level.  
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Table 3. Potential Attributes for the Dimensions
 Regression 
Dimension 1
β1 
Dimension 2 
β2 
R
1. Planned/spontaneous 0.47* 0.82*** 0.61*** 
2. Serious/not serious 0.71*** 0.57** 0.68*** 
3. Difficult/easy to commit  0.21 0.08 0.14 
4. Frequent/occasional occurrence -0.12 -0.60** 0.46** 
5. Direct/indirect harm to organization 0.90*** 0.22 0.71*** 
6. Data leakage to outsiders/insiders 0.69* -0.14 0.39* 
7. Desire to gain personal benefits/hurt organization 0.37 -0.48 0.35 
8. High/low risk of exposing data 0.51** -0.25 0.50** 
9. Protection/destruction-related issue -0.45* -0.32 0.44* 
10. Easy/difficult to detect 0.21 0.08 0.15 
11. May incur sever/mild punishment 0.47* 0.71** 0.54** 
12. Security policy helps/can’t help 0.33 0.35 0.36 
* p<0.05;  ** p<0.01;  *** p<0.001 
To select the best attributes for the dimensions, Kruskal and Wish (1978) suggest two selection criteria: 1) 
a high multiple correlation for the scale with significance at the 0.01 level or better, and 2) a high beta 
weight on that dimension. Considering the multiple correlation criterion, we found that six bipolar scales 
(“difficult to commit/easy to commit”, “data leakage to outsiders/data leakage to insiders”, “desire to gain 
personal benefits/desire to hurt organization”, “protection-related issue/destruction-related issue”, “easy to 
detect/difficult to detect”, and “security policy can help to avert the deviance/security policy cannot help to 
avert the deviance”) were unlikely to explain the dimensions because their respective multiple correlation 
coefficient was either not significant or significant at only the 0.05 level. Table 4 rearranges the order of 
the bipolar scales with the above six bipolar scales deleted according to their beta weights on the 
dimensions of each MDS space. We interpret each dimension of the space by examining Table 4. 
Table 4. Coordinates of Sorted Attributes
 Dimension 1 Dimension 2
Direct/indirect harm 0.9*** Planned/spontaneous 0.82***
Serious/not serious 0.71*** May incur severe/mild punishment       0.71**
High/low risk of exposing data       0.51** Serious/not serious       0.57** 
Planned/spontaneous       0.47* Direct/indirect harm       0.22 
May incur severe/mild punishment       0.47* High/low risk of exposing data       -0.25 
Frequent/occasional occurrence      -0.12 Frequent/occasional occurrence      -0.60** 
 
Note: These loadings are sorted to correspond with the two-dimensional space 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Dimension 1 (perceived losses): Table 4 shows that the attributes that best explain dimension 1 are 
those related to the perceived losses to the organizations from the behavior. Direct/indirect harm to 
organization is listed at the top (β = 0.9, p < 0.001), followed by serious/not serious (β = 0.71, p < 0.001) 
and high/low risk of exposing data (β = 0.51, p < 0.01). Thus, one end of the first dimension refers to high 
perceived losses while the other end refers to low perceived losses. Consequently, we label dimension 1 
as “deviance with high perceived losses versus deviance with low perceived losses”. Dimension 1 is like a 
mirror image of the general deterrence theory (GDT), a criminological theory that focuses on 
“disincentives” or sanctions in deterring people from committing criminal and deviant acts (Blumstein, 
Cohen, & Nagin, 1978; Straub, 1990). GDT tells us that employees are less likely to commit deviant acts if 
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they find the chance of being punished is high and the penalty serious. GDT considers deviant behavior 
from an organizational perspective, while dimension 1 explains an individual’s beliefs about the deviant 
behavior. Employees are concerned about the consequences of the behavior. They understand that some 
types of behavior are more serious and may have a chance to lead to high losses to the organizations and 
that others are less serious and less risky. The dimension label “deviance with high perceived losses 
versus deviance with low perceived losses” is consistent with the findings in the two-dimensional 
configuration in Table 2. We can find from observation that the types of deviant behavior that are less 
serious and have lower risk of exposing data are on the positive side of dimension 1 and that the types of 
behavior that are more serious and have higher risk of exposing data are on the negative side of 
dimension 1.  
We can reasonably say that some types of behavior are expected to create higher losses. Very often, we 
classify losses as expected losses and unexpected losses. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(2001, p. 33) refers to expected losses as “the mean of the loss distribution” and to unexpected losses as 
“the tail of the loss distribution”. In other words, expected losses are expected regular losses that are 
relatively trivial, but unexpected losses are greater and sustainable losses. This suggests that deviance 
with high perceived losses may involve unexpected losses that affect organizations’ computer systems or 
a large amount of company data, whereas deviance with low perceived losses may mainly be expected 
losses that affect individual computers or a small amount of data.    
Dimension 2 (frequency): Table 4 shows that the attribute that best explains dimension 2 is 
planned/spontaneous (β = 0.82, p < 0.001), followed by severe/mild punishment (β = 0.71, p < 0.01) and 
frequent/occasional occurrence (β = -0.6, p < 0.01). The negative sign of the β value of 
frequent/occasional occurrence means that employees perceive frequent deviance as spontaneous 
deviance that deserves less punishment and occasional deviance as planned behavior that deserves 
more punishment. We can deduce that one extreme of the dimension indicates more common ISDB and 
that the other extreme represents less common ISDB. Therefore, we use the label “high frequency 
deviance versus low frequency deviance” for dimension 2. By observation, the two-dimensional 
configuration in Table 2 supports the label used. We can say that, in general, the forms of ISDB with 
positive values in dimension 2 occur more commonly in the workplace. On the contrary, the forms of ISDB 
with negative values in dimension 2 are relatively less common.  
We can reasonably say that some types of ISDB are committed more frequently while others are 
committed less frequently. According to the rational choice theory, individuals are inclined to make 
choices that maximize total utility (Herrnstein, 1990). Individuals are assumed to maximize utility in a given 
and stable set of preferences when choosing the course of action (Smelser & Swedberg, 1994). In other 
words, when individuals make choices, they evaluate the costs and benefits of all choices in the process 
of choosing and then select the one that maximizes the value of consequences. When they find that the 
course of action benefits them, they are more likely to go along with it. On the contrary, when they better 
understand the costs of a course of action, they are less likely to follow it through. These points imply that 
those frequently committed types of ISDB must be the ones that provide some personal benefits to the 
employees or incur lower costs to them, whereas those less commonly committed types of ISDB must be 
the ones that provide fewer personal benefits or are more destructive. 
4.4 Typology 
4.4.1 Four Ideal Types of Behavior 
In the two dimensions and the two-dimensional configuration, we conducted further investigation by 
organizing ISDB into interrelated types of behavior. Figure 2 exhibits the typology of ISDB. We can 
organize the behavior into four ideal types that are interrelated along two dimensions—perceived losses 
and frequency. They are “high frequency, high perceived losses” deviance, “high frequency, low perceived 
losses” deviance, “low frequency, low perceived losses” deviance, and “low frequency, high perceived 
losses” deviance. 
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Figure 2. Typology of Information Security Deviant Behavior2 
“High frequency, high perceived losses” deviance (misuse of information systems resources): this 
type of ISDB is common in the workplace and can lead to severe consequences. From the MDS results, 
this type of behavior is mainly related to the misuse or unauthorized use of any information systems 
resources including applications, the Internet, and network in the workplace. Therefore, we name this type 
of ISDB misuse of information systems resources. It embraces Schechtman et al.’s (2006) idea about 
Internet abuse and is similar to D’Arcy et al.’s (2009, p. 79) information systems misuse, which is 
“intentional insider misuse of information systems resources”. Note, however, that employees’ 
unauthorized access to company data, which was one of the scenarios of D’Arcy et al. (2009), is not 
included in this type. This echoes D’Arcy and Havav’s (2007a) observation that research on information 
security misuse produced conflicting results. It could be the result of the scenarios selected for study. We 
can reasonably classify misuse of information systems resources as a “high frequency, high perceived 
losses” deviance. Employees receive instant tangible benefits, such as time savings or extra information, 
via public resources from misusing resources. It is a deviance with high perceived losses because it can 
affect the company network and, thus, involves both high expected losses (e.g., computer breakdown) 
and high unexpected losses (e.g., huge data losses due to hacking). We can see why existing information 
security studies emphasize information systems misuse because its impacts on organizational security 
are relatively more significant.  
“High frequency, low perceived losses” deviance (information security carelessness): this type of 
ISDB is expected to be mild in nature and more common. From the MDS results, we can see that this type 
of behavior is related to employees’ bad habits in using computers or handling data in daily operations. 
Employees commit the behavior mainly due to convenience or bad habits, which are less related to 
personal benefits. They do not intend to damage their organizational information systems, but they are not 
security conscious. In addition, they do not feel that the behavior creates any costs for them since they 
think that others are acting the same way in the workplace. This type of behavior tends to bring high 
                                                     
2  The list is not exhaustive. The figure contains only some typical forms of ISDB from Figure 1 for illustration purposes. 
Access control deviance 
 
‐ Sharing password/account with 
colleagues 
‐ Gaining unauthorized access 
‐ Guessing colleague’s password 
‐ Writing down passwords  
Information security carelessness 
 
‐ Taking away company documents 
‐ Copying company documents into 
removable storage devices 
‐ Disclosing information for non-work-
related purposes 
‐ Saving documents in improper locations 
 
High perceived losses 
Misuse of information systems 
resources 
 
‐ Connecting to unauthorized wireless 
network  
‐ Installing untrusted applications  
‐ Running untrusted applications 
‐ Using instant messaging services 
without permission  
System protection deviance
 
‐ Distributing malicious code  
‐ Not performing critical security audits 
and assessments  
‐ Stopping company’s security 
protection  
‐ Forwarding suspicious mails/Web links 
         Low frequency 
High frequency  
Low perceived losses 
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expected losses but relatively low unexpected losses because it usually has less impact on the 
organizational network or information systems. Consequently, security carelessness is a “high frequency, 
low perceived losses” deviance. Previous literature has studied similar deviance. For example, Workman, 
Bommer, and Straub (2008) investigated omissive security behavior to understand the “knowing-doing” 
gap in information security.  
“Low frequency, high perceived losses” deviance (system protection deviance): this type of ISDB is 
usually fairly uncommon in the workplace but can result in severe consequences. From the MDS results, 
we can see that this type of behavior is usually committed by irresponsible employees and can lead to 
security disasters in organizations. Thus, we label this type of behavior as system protection deviance. 
The employees usually do not receive instant personal benefits from committing this type of ISDB. 
However, this type of behavior can harm organizations seriously and, thus, create not only expected 
losses but also unexpected losses because the impact is more likely at the system or network level. 
Therefore, system protection deviance is a “low frequency, high perceived losses” deviance. Relatively 
little behavioral research has been conducted on this type of ISDB because the topic is relatively 
sensitive.  
“Low frequency, low perceived losses” deviance (access control deviance): this type of ISDB is 
believed to be mild in nature and less common in the workplace. From the MDS results, we can see that 
this type of behavior is related to passwords or access and violates the company rules of data security or 
data protection. Therefore, we label this type of behavior as access control deviance. Employees may not 
receive instant benefits from committing access control deviance but they may perceive a high cost 
associated with it because most organizations use password authentication to prevent security breaches 
(Zhang, Luo, Akkaladevi, & Ziegelmayer, 2009) and request their employees to be aware of password-
related issues. Moreover, this type of ISDB usually results in relatively low expected losses and 
unexpected losses because the deviance is inside the organization and the impact is normally limited to 
individual cases. Accordingly, access control deviance is a “low frequency, low perceived losses” 
deviance. Researchers have studied password behavior in the past. For example, Hoonakker et al. (2009) 
studied the bad password practices of end users. 
4.5 Step 4: Empirical Testing 
4.5.1 Falsifiability 
The two dimensions we propose in the “Interpreting the Two Dimensions” section above support Straub 
and Welke’s (1998, pp. 442-443) proposition regarding systems security risk, which refers to “the risk that 
the firm’s information and/or information systems are not sufficiently protected against certain kinds of 
damage or loss”. The basic concept of risk is as follows: 
Risk exposure  =  probability of risk occurring  x  losses incurred 
By considering the above formula, we can create a risk exposure index for each form or each type of 
ISDB based on the findings in Table 1 because frequency can be a measurement of probability and 
perceived losses can be a measurement of losses incurred. The two dimensions are noteworthy for at 
least two reasons. First, Doty and Glick (1994) emphasize that one can use a typology to predict a specific 
outcome. We can now use the findings from the typology developed in this paper to predict the risk 
exposure of each type of the deviance. Second, the findings are also important for quantifying ISDB, 
which are sources of systems security risk, because we can now identify each form of the behavior 
according to its frequency and perceived losses. 
At this point, we have fulfilled and discussed two criteria for a theory: identifying constructs (misuse of 
information systems resources, information security carelessness, access control deviance, and system 
protection deviance) and specifying relationships among these constructs (the constructs are interrelated 
based on perceived losses and frequency). Next, we consider the falsifiability of the typology, which 
implies that the typology must be testable and subjected to disconfirmation (Doty & Glick, 1994). Lee 
(2004, p. 3) suggests using the term “empirically testable” to describe the falsifiability property. The 
typology developed in Figure 2 offers some interesting propositions for empirical testing. In terms of 
frequency, we expect misuse of information systems resources to be a more common type of ISDB in the 
workplace than system protection deviance, and information security carelessness to be a more common 
type than access control deviance. In terms of perceived losses, we expect misuse of information systems 
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resources to be higher than information security carelessness and system protection deviance to be 
higher than access control deviance. As such, we hypothesize that: 
H1. Relative to system protection deviance, misuse of information systems resources is a more 
common type of ISDB.  
H2. Relative to access control deviance, information security carelessness is a more common type of 
ISDB.  
H3. Relative to information security carelessness, misuse of information systems resources is higher 
in perceived losses. 
H4. Relative to access control deviance, system protection deviance is higher in perceived losses.  
4.5.2 Data Collection 
We conducted a Web-based survey (Survey IV) consisting of all 40 descriptions in ISDB in Table 2 to 
understand the relative frequency and perceived losses of the four types of ISDB in a real business 
environment. We surveyed a group of IT professionals who we randomly picked from a database 
maintained by a marketing research company that had substantial experience in conducting information 
security surveys with IT professionals who work in IT-related departments and whose organizational 
positions varied from programmer to information systems manager across various industries. We chose IT 
professionals as our respondents because they were the most relevant group of people to evaluate all 40 
descriptions in ISDB. We asked them two research questions: first, “how common is the behavior within 
the IT profession?” This question was related to the frequency of ISDB committed by the IT professionals. 
We required respondents to indicate the extent of engagement in each of the 40 forms of ISDB on seven-
point Likert scales (1 = never, 2 = almost never, 3 = a very few times, 4 = occasionally, 5 = often, 6 = quite 
often, and 7 = very many times). The second question was: “what do you think the expected financial 
losses are if incident occurs from the behavior?”. This question was associated with the perceived losses 
of ISDB. We used the expected financial losses incurred to represent the perceived losses of the behavior 
because it is one of the most popular measures in risk assessment (King, 2001). The respondents 
indicated their answers based on seven-point Likert scales (1 = very low to 7 = very high). A total of 102 
respondents participated in this study. 
4.5.3 Data Analysis and Results 
We created measurement items for the four constructs developed in this study—misuse of information 
systems resources, information security carelessness, access control deviance, and system protection 
deviance—based on the two-dimensional perceptual map in Figure 1. We grouped nine items out of the 
40 items under misuse of information systems misuse (items 15, 19, 20, 23, 26, 29, 30, 31, and 32), 13 
under information security carelessness (items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 22, and 27), eight 
under access control deviance (items 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 33, and 34), and 10 under system protection 
deviance (items 21, 24, 25, 28, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, and 40). We computed a composite score for each 
construct by averaging the scores obtained from its respective measurement items. This technique is 
similar to that employed by D’Arcy and Hovav (2007a) when they generalized patterns of information 
systems misuse from specific scenarios. We tested the four hypotheses by comparing the mean 
composite scores using one-tailed paired t-tests. Table 5 displays the mean score differences between 
misuse of information systems resources and system protection deviance as well as between information 
security carelessness and access control deviance in terms of frequency. Supporting H1, misuse of 
information systems resources was more common than system protection deviance (t = 13.11, p < 0.001). 
We found that information security carelessness was more common than access control deviance (t = 
9.87, p < 0.001), which supports H2. Table 6 shows the mean score differences between misuse of 
information systems resources and information security carelessness and between system protection 
deviance and access control deviance in terms of perceived losses. Supporting H4, system protection 
deviance was higher in perceived losses than access control deviance (t = 9.55, p < 0.001). However, no 
significant evidence supports H3 (i.e., that misuse of information systems resources is higher in perceived 
losses than information security carelessness).   
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Table 5. Mean Score Differences (Frequency)
 
N Mean Mean difference S.D.
Test 
statistic Significance
Misuse of information systems resources 102 2.23 
0.75 0.58 13.11 P < 0.001 
System protection deviance 102 1.48 
 
Information security carelessness 102 2.21 
0.56 0.58 9.87 P < 0.001 
Access control deviance 102 1.65 
 
Table 6. Mean Score Differences (Perceived losses)
 
N Mean Mean difference S.D.
Test 
statistic Significance
Misuse of information systems resources 102 4.88 
-0.11 0.46 -2.39 n.s. 
Information security carelessness 102 4.98 
 
System protection deviance 102 5.61 
0.39 0.41 9.55 P < 0.001 
Access control deviance 102 5.23 
5 Discussion 
Employees’ information security deviance is a major concern for organizations. However, due to its 
sensitive nature, ISDB has been an underdeveloped topic (Kotulic & Clark, 2004; Werlinger, Hawkey, & 
Beznosov, 2009). With this research, we explore ISDB and investigate the interrelationships among 
different types of ISDB by constructing a typology that fulfills four primary criteria of being a theory. First, 
we clearly define ISDB and the study’s boundaries. We define ISDB as the voluntary behavior of 
employees within organizations that differs markedly from the information security norms of the 
organizations and that is normally considered by other employees to be inappropriate behavior in 
organizations. We consolidate a pool of 40 descriptions in ISDB. Second, we identify four types of ISDB: 
misuse of information systems resources, information security carelessness, access control deviance, and 
system protection deviance. Third, we found that these four types of ISDB were interrelated along two 
dimensions—perceived losses and frequency. Fourth, we subjected the relationships among the four 
types of ISDB to hypothesis testing. Theory development is crucial to growing information systems 
research (Gregor, 2006, Weber, 2012). This paper makes an important theoretical contribution by 
demonstrating how we can develop a typology, which is a unique form of theory building, for a relatively 
underdeveloped topic. The suggested procedure can help researchers to develop typologies of interested 
areas. Typology is useful for understanding the nature of a behavior and as a framework for building 
theories for the behavior because it explains what the variants of the behavior are and how they are 
interrelated. However, many researchers have built their typologies in an unsystematic or a subjective way 
that can only be called classification systems or taxonomies. The quantitative approach we suggest in this 
study could be adopted for developing typologies. The approach can be used to develop a fully specified 
typology based on empirical methods in a systematic manner. We use MDS, together with other statistical 
techniques, to uncover two underlying dimensions and identify four ideal types of ISDB. MDS itself is data 
driven and can only be used to develop an inductive and empirically derived model that cannot be treated 
as a theory. However, by using MDS in the suggested way, a theory can be built for a relatively 
underdeveloped topic. This theory building procedure is useful for exploring new or underdeveloped 
research topics. 
This study’s findings have implications for both research and practice. For research, the study clarifies the 
different types of ISDB and their interrelationships and differences. The findings are useful for researchers 
when adopting scenario study in their ISDB-related research. Some researchers have limited their studies 
to a few specific hypothetical scenarios when they studied information security deviance. This is a 
reasonable and effective survey method when studying a behavior that has many variants. For example, 
D’Arcy and Hovav (2007a) computed a composite score for information systems misuse by averaging the 
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scores obtained from five scenarios—password sharing, inappropriate use of email, use of unlicensed 
software, unauthorized access to computerized data, and unauthorized modification of computerized 
data—when they studied the influence of user awareness of security countermeasures on information 
systems misuse. Our findings suggest that one should select the scenarios carefully because the behavior 
studied may be described along a continuum of dimensions. If extreme forms of the behavior are included, 
the results may be misinterpreted. D’Arcy and Hovav (2007a) report that research on information security 
misuse produced conflicting results. This conflict might have something to do with their selection of 
scenarios. Therefore, the typology is important for scenario selection.  
Without a clear definition of a behavior and knowing the interrelationships of different types of the 
behavior, further investigations may be difficult to conduct. This could be the very reason why only 
isolated research efforts on information security deviance have been made in the past. We propose a 
theoretical ISDB framework for constituting a critical starting point for the development of instruments of 
the behavior and the further development of research models on ISDB. We developed a two-dimensional 
ISDB typology that identifies the relationships among different types of ISDB and their underlying 
constructs. Researchers can follow the framework to develop reliable and valid instruments to measure 
ISDB or start to build and test theoretical models of the different types of ISDB, such as information 
security careless and access control deviance. The framework may enable researchers to systematically 
investigate behaviors.     
Some practical implications also emerge from our findings. The list of the 40 typical descriptions in ISDB 
and the findings of perceived losses and frequency as the two dimensions provide more insights for 
managers to understand different forms of ISDB, their relationships, and their impacts on organizations. 
Special attention should be paid to the forms of ISDB in misuse of information systems resources because 
it is a “high frequency, high perceived losses” deviance. Bennett and Robinson (2000) and Robinson and 
Bennett (1997) suggest that, if an employee engages in behavior that belongs to a particular behavioral 
family, then that employee has a greater tendency to engage in other forms of behavior in that family 
relative to other families. For instance, if staff member Sarah likes to take away company information 
without permission (a form of information security carelessness), she has a higher chance to perform 
other forms of information security carelessness such as copying company documents into her removable 
storage devices without permission or disclosing company information for non-work-related purposes. 
This information is useful for managers to understand the information security level in organizations from 
different aspects by observing staff behavior so as to develop better security strategy. 
Moreover, this paper also helps managers measure ISDB under the typology setting. Normally, it is 
difficult to quantify a behavior. However, under our typological framework involving the two dimensions—
perceived losses and frequency, we can now quantify ISDB. One could adopt an appropriate actuarial 
model to assess the risk of ISDB. For example, Wang, Chaudhury, and Rao (2008) use the concept of 
value-at-risk (VaR) (Crouhy, Galai, & Mark, 2001; Duffie & Pan 1997; Jorion, 2007)—a statistical analysis 
method that takes expected losses and unexpected losses into account and has been widely used as a 
tool for measuring financial risk (e.g., So & Yu, 2006; Wong & So, 2003)—to develop an actuarial model 
for information security investment strategy. By extending the VaR concept to ISDB, we can also derive 
an actuarial model for ISDB. Managers can then use this model to formulate security investment strategy 
for preventing ISDB. Therefore, one future avenue of research may be in using statistical or financial 
analysis techniques to quantify the risk of ISDB.  
The falsifiability test examines the relationships among the four types of ISDB. Consistent with our 
expectation, misuse of information systems resources was more common than system protection 
deviance and security carelessness was more common than access control deviance. Moreover, system 
protection deviance was higher in perceived losses than access control deviance. However, we found no 
significant evidence that misuse of information systems resources was higher in perceived losses than 
security carelessness from our survey results, which we did not expect. We can explain this finding in two 
ways. First, the result may be affected by the expected losses and unexpected losses, which we did not 
explicitly consider because we asked the respondents only about the expected financial losses. Second, 
we considered all items in the list of ISDB. However, some forms of the behavior perform differently from 
others even if they are all of the same deviance type. These explanations should be verified in the future.  
One limitation of this study is that our pool of ISDB may not be exhaustive. However, we do not mean to 
compile an exhaustive list of ISDB because technology is advancing on a daily basis and new forms of 
ISDB emerge all the time. Instead, we demonstrate how to construct a typological theory for a relatively 
underdeveloped topic, which allows future researchers to adopt the typology development process 
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suggested herein to explore new research topics in their domains of interest. In this study, we use ISDB 
as an exemplar and develop a typology on ISDB that can explain the relationships among different types 
of ISDB based on some underlying dimensions. Another limitation is that the significance of the falsifiable 
test of the typology tends to rely on self-reported data. was Although, with this falsifiable test, we mean to 
demonstrate how the four types of deviance can be tested, we paid every effort to collect the most 
representative responses, such as using diverse samples and anonymous responses. A typology is a 
good start to describe and understand organizational diversity, but a limitation in using typology to study a 
behavior is that it focuses on examining differences between types of the behavior in general situations, 
ignores differences that may exist in a specific type of the behavior, and excludes specific circumstances. 
This reduces the individuality of cases. For example, items in a type of ISDB could lead to different degree 
of severe consequences and the degree of the severe consequences may change owing to specific 
situations. It would be worthwhile discovering how different types of ISDB affect organizations in various 
scenarios. Further, a limitation on MDS to develop a typology is the configurations generated through 
MDS may not always fully interpretable. Thus, the interpretation process can be subjective and result in 
researcher bias. To reduce the bias and develop more representative attributes in interpreting the 
dimensions, we used both qualitative judgment (opinion elicitation from survey respondents) and a 
quantitative methodology (judgmental analysis using multiple regression).  
In summary, we provide answers to the questions of what ISDB is and how its types are organized by 
developing a typology for ISDB using a quantitative approach. The consolidated list of ISDB and the four 
types of the behavior proposed can help managers to understand the influence of the behavior in 
organizations more deeply and, thus, develop appropriate awareness programs to increase the 
organizational security level and strategy to prevent the occurrence of security incidents. For researchers, 
the proposed procedure provides another approach for theory building. Moreover, with the understanding 
of the interrelationships among different types of ISDB, the selection of deviance situations for research 
purposes would be more appropriate as ISDB can be different in nature and can be in various forms. To 
our best knowledge, this is one of the pioneer studies to profile ISDB in detail theoretically. The need to 
call for more empirical research to study the dark side of security behavior demands greater research 
emphasis (Mahmood et al., 2010; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). A typology of ISDB, as presented in this 
study, provides an organized and theoretical framework for researchers to conduct further studies on 
ISDB. 
6 Conclusion 
Previous research has sometimes confused typology with classification or taxonomy. Typology is a unique 
form of theory building but classification and taxonomy are not. Following a systematic review of the 
literature, Guilllemette and Paré (2012) developed a new typology of the contribution of IT function. 
However, their proposed qualitative methodology may not be useful for underdeveloped or new topics in 
the literature. As such, in this paper, we outline a generic procedure for developing a typology that fulfills 
the criteria of a theory using a quantitative approach for researchers to develop typological theories in 
their domains of interest. We expect that our rigorous quantitative approach in developing typological 
theories will help researchers to explore new topics or behavior in the information systems field.  
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Appendix A: Literature on Negative Forms of Information Security 
Behavior 
Table A1. Literature on Negative Forms of Information Security Behavior 
Behavior References
Computer abuse 
Harrington (1996), Lee, Lee, & Yoo (2004), Lowry, 
Moody, Galletta, & Vance (2012), Posey, Bennett, & 
Roberts (2011a, 2011b), Straub (1990), Straub & Nance 
(1990), Willison & Warkentin (2013) 
End user security behavior Stanton et al. (2005) 
Information systems misuse D’Arcy et al. (2007a, 2007b), D’Arcy et al. (2009), Hovav & D’Arcy (2012) 
Information technology abuse Campbell & Lu (2007) 
Intentional information security breaches 
by insider 
Shropshire (2009) 
Internet abuse Schechtman et al. (2006) 
Insider security contravention Workman & Gathegi (2007) 
IS security policy violation/ Information 
security policy abuse 
Hu et al. (2011), Siponen & Vance (2010), Vance & 
Siponen (2012) 
Misuse of information technology 
resources 
D’Arcy and Devaraj (2012) 
Nonmalicious security violations/non-
malicious computer and information 
security deviations 
Hoonakker et al. (2009), Guo, Yuan, Archer, & Connelly 
(2011) 
Non-work-related computing  Bock & Ho (2009), Pee et al. (2008) 
Omissive behavior Workman et al. (2008) 
Software privacy Peace, Galletta, & Thong (2003), Kwan, So, & Tam (2010) 
Appendix B: Writing Style Guidelines 
Table B1. Literature on Negative Forms of Information Security Behavior 
 Survey I 
(N = 204) 
Survey II
(N = 195) 
Survey III 
(N = 30) 
Survey IV
(N = 102) 
Percentage of respondents
Industry     
Manufacturing 6 0 0 13 
Wholesale and retail 9 18 7 2 
Education and health 23 0 20 5 
Business services 2 13 7 7 
Finance and insurance 9 22 13 8 
Transportation, information technology, and 
communications 
22 23 30 32 
Social and personal services 20 0 7 7 
Government 5 24 16 18 
Others 4 0 0 8 
Company size (# of employees)     
Fewer than 100 38 30 27 52 
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Table B1. Literature on Negative Forms of Information Security Behavior 
100-499 22 30 23 15 
500 or more 40 40 50 33 
Position     
Managerial 25 28 50 43 
Technical 28 21 17 35 
Professional staff 12 9 33 22 
Administrative/clerical 35 42 0 0 
Department     
IT-related department 31 38 40 100 
Non-IT-related department 69 62 60 0 
Gender     
Male 62 60 63 68 
Female 38 40 37 32 
Age     
18-24 22 2 0 12 
25-34 28 45 33 43 
35-44 34 50 50 24 
45-54 12 3 10 13 
55 and over 4 0 7 8 
Education level     
High school/non-degree 21 0 0 7 
Degree or above 79 100 100 93 
Appendix C: Implementation of Multidimensional Scaling 
In this study, we analyzed the n = 40 forms of ISDB by using multidimensional scaling (MDS). We 
collected dissimilarities of all n(n-1)/2 pairwise combinations of the 40 forms of ISDB by survey. The 
dissimilarities (i and j = 1,…, 40) represent how people rated the similarity among the 40 forms of the 
behavior.  
We recruited a total of 195 employees from 10 organizations. Because of the large number of distinct 
pairs of the descriptions to rank (n(n-1))/2 = 40x39/2 = 780), we required each respondent to only evaluate 
a subsample (40 ratings) of the distinct pairs. That is, we gave each respondent one of the 40 versions of 
the questionnaire randomly to complete. That means each possible pair of descriptions was rated by 10 
randomly selected respondents (195x40/780 = 10). We then obtained each dissimilarity   by averaging the 
ratings given by the 10 respondents on the similarity between behavior i and behavior j. Scholars have 
suggested this conditional rank order process of asking respondents to compare a subset instead of the 
full set to be a valid method to avoid potential difficulties and errors associated with comparing a large 
number of pairs of stimuli (Thompson, 1983; Young, 1975). Some studies that have adopted MDS in their 
surveys used this process to reduce information overload for respondents (e.g., Pearce & Amato, 1980; 
Robinson & Bennett, 1995; Schiffman, Reynolds, & Young, 1981; Simon & Eby, 2003). 
Implementing MDS 
We primarily used MDS in this study to identify a configuration matrix X that best represents the 
proximity/dissimilarity of the 40 forms of ISDB. This X has n rows where the ith row gives the k (<= n) 
coordinates of behavior i in a k-dimensional map. In other words, X determines the location of the n forms 
of the behavior and the dissimilarity among different forms of the behavior by dij(X), the distance between 
behavior i and behavior j where i, j = 1, …, n. The distance in a map can be calculated as: 
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, 
where Xib is the bth coordinate of the ith behavior. Since δij  is the “observed” dissimilarity (given by the 
Likert scores in our case), a good configuration X should produce dij(X) close to δij. However, it is unlikely 
to find a configuration of points whose pairwise distance matches exactly or is montonically related to the 
original dissimilarities. To obtain the best X for a given dimension k, we minimized Kruskal’s (1964) Stress 
index defined by 
 
with respect to X. The smaller the stress value, the smaller the discrepancy between the observed 
dissimilarities  δij and dij(X). We used the MDS procedure in the SAS system (Clark, 2004) by adopting a 
nonlinear least-squares method to obtain X for various k. We created a similarities/dissimilarities matrix by 
merging the data collected from the questionnaire to run the SAS program. When dimension k increases, 
the stress value decreases. However, a higher dimension means a more complex configuration map 
which may not be desirable in the interpretation perspective. The stress value is a good reference for 
identifying a suitable k for developing a parsimonious configuration X while maintaining a reasonably good 
match between δij and dij(X). 
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